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Introduction
During the nineteenth century scientists, philosophers, artists, engineers, medics and fascinated
audiences were interested in phenomena and experiences which appeared to confound,
disturb, disrupt and unsettle distinctions between the self and other, inside and out, natural
and cultural, real and unreal, material and immaterial, subjective and collective and past and
present. This included mediumship, table-tilting, rapping, hypnotic suggestion, telepathy,
hallucinatory phenomena and other unusual entities and processes. These experiences have
largely now become the subject and object of a particular research field within psychology and
the cognitive sciences, known as the “psychology of anomalous experience.” However, their
mystery and puzzling and enigmatic status continue to engage our imaginations and carry
longstanding reflections related to the question of what it means to be human, what it means to
be embodied, and what remains inexplicable and un-representable. I will use the term
immateriality in this paper to describe these processes, practices and phenomena; as in its usual
definition immateriality refers to processes taken to have no material body or form (also to be
unseen, invisible or ghostly). One common example related to this version of immateriality is
that the mind is immaterial (related to ideation) and separate and distinct from the body as a
material substance or process. The designation Immaterial also often assumes that something is
of little or no relevance or consequence. These are all assumptions I wish to challenge. I am
mindful that the term immaterial also has other genealogies within contemporary philosophy
and media and cultural theory, which challenge this thinking. These are the subject of other
papers in this special issue, and which this paper I hope can be read in dialogue with.
I want to start by reflecting on what is articulated by the term, new, in New Immaterialities, the
focus and title of this special issue. The prefix new suggests a turn to something overlooked,
obscured, undiscovered or genuinely new in discussions of power, technology, the human and
non-human, the body and subjectivity, for example. This has now become familiar terrain
across the arts, humanities and social sciences, with increasing attention being paid to what are
taken to be common ontologies emerging across science and the humanities. In a special issue
on Affect, for example, I argued with Couze Venn that interest in the themes of immaterial and
affective labour and the capitalization or economization of affect and emotion through
teletechnologies and a multitude of therapies have drawn attention to affect as a phenomenon
in need of fresh study. Advances in the fields of genetics, the biological sciences, mathematics,
quantum physics/the physics of small particles, neurosciences and media and information
theory have contributed to an epistemological shift. In its wake, there are seen to be common
ontologies linking the social and the natural, the mind and body, the cognitive and affective,
the material and immaterial, grounded in such concepts as assemblage, flow, turbulence,
ISSN 1444­3775
11/27/2014 TRANSFORMATIONS Journal of Media & Culture
http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/25/01.shtml 2/12
emergence, becoming, compossibility, relationality, the machinic, the event, the virtual,
temporality, autopoiesis and the informational, for example.
These common ontologies have created some of the conditions for new research traditions and
fields to emerge, often articulated as “turns.” One example of this is of course the turn towards
“New Materialism,” a turn that although subject to critique (see Ahmed) has provided a rubric
and focus for debating questions of ontology and for encouraging a rapprochement with the
biological and life sciences (see Rose and Abi-Rached). This is often framed as bringing an end
to particular kinds of critique and a move towards developing a closer, sensitive and intimate
connection with science (Wilson). Often turns are not just marked out as particular research
areas, but register “various paradigmatic breaks” with the past (Wetherell 350), wearily
reproducing the very progressivist and linear narratives that have been reworked over and over
in our critical thinking. Rather than attending to the more “complex and contested process(es)
of iteration and transformation” (Kember), turns assume movements from one episteme to
another; from one set of theories, concepts, methods and explanations to others. The rejection
of the idea of a turn is explored in my book Immaterial Bodies: Affect, Embodiment, Mediation
through a genealogical method of inquiry, which also recognises that as well as historical
discontinuities one can also examine those aspects of historical continuity that are passed and
transmitted through silences, gaps, omissions, echoes and murmurs. This is more akin to a
hauntology, which recognises the disjointedness of time and space and how, as Karen Barad in
her later reflections on hauntology argues, what we might witness are rather “entanglements of
here and there (and) now and then” (244).
As Christina Hughes and Celia Lury similarly argue, “rather than the currently ubiquitous
narratives of “turns” with their endless twists, ruptures and sudden encounters, such returns
are products of repetition, of coming back to persistent troublings; they are turnings over. In
such re-turnings, there is no singular or unified progressive history or approach to discover”
(787). In previous work, I have also drawn on Isabelle Stengers, who has advocated a “going
back” in order to resurrect archives, figures and theories that have seemingly been forgotten.
She cogently shows how reversing the logic of scientific invention enables one to see, in a
contemporary light, how “questions that have been abandoned or repudiated by one discipline
have moved silently into another, reappearing in a new theoretical context” (49). She argues
that it is never simply the case that questions have been definitely abandoned or refused. As I
argue, what we might be more likely to see is the way in which questions are slightly modified
or translated, or particular theories exist in a dynamic relationship with those that elide or
disavow the claims they might make. This is the “background context” that Vincianne Despret
argues is what makes practices of science-making so creative and inventive. They exist in
relations of disequilibrium, disqualification, coexistence, conflict and continuation with those
versions that are kept in the background. This relates to what Stengers refers to as the “deep
communications beyond the proliferation of disciplines” (49). As the reader might be aware
therefore, I do not wish to articulate my interest in immaterialities as a turn, but rather I wish to
(re)turn to an archive of psychological experimentation at the turn of the 20th century. I argue
that this archive provides an important case-study for thinking through what is at stake in
delineating specific entities, objects, processes and phenomena as immaterial. What such a
designation might do in our theorising is the important focus of this article.
Immaterial Bodies
In Immaterial Bodies I return to an archive of psychological experimentation, which acts as an
interesting precursor to the performative approach to experimentation that we find in the work
of Barad for example. Barad’s writing and particularly her book Meeting the Universe Halfway:
Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning has been hugely influential in
shaping what has come to be known as New Materialism, or the Material Turn, and for
introducing new concepts, methods and formulations, which have shaped what has come to
matter for many theorists. I will return to Barad’s work later in the article as there are
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interesting overlaps with my approach to immateriality and Barad’s own analyses of the
liveliness of matter. The particular experiments I analyse in my book, relevant to this discussion,
are those which took place at William James’s Harvard Psychological Laboratory, under the
tutelage of Hugo Münsterberg. These experiments involved two psychology undergraduate
students, Leo Solomons and Gertrude Stein. Münsterberg might be more known to readers for
his work on cinema published in his 1909 book, Photoplay: A Psychological Study. Stein is more
commonly known as the lesbian avant-garde modernist writer. However, prior to her literary
career she experimented with a particular apparatus, which was designed to induce hysteria
within the laboratory.
Solomons and Stein were not interested in proving or disproving theories of hysteria, but rather
approached hysteria as an expression of automatism; of the feeling of being moved or directed
by someone or something else. This might include the feeling of being directed by an extra-
personal force or entity for example. There were many experiences that were considered
examples of automaticity that psychologists, artists, economists, medics and scientists were
interested in studying at the time, including hallucinations, all manner of suggestive
phenomena, including hypnotic suggestion, crowd psychology, delusions, dissociative
experiences (hysteria being a primary example), various contagions, and psychic phenomena,
such as telepathy, mediumship, clairvoyance and precognition; the capacity to apprehend and
feel the future, for example. I argue in my book that they approached these experiences as
threshold phenomena that displaced and blurred boundaries between past and present, self
and other, material and immaterial, psychological and social, and human and non-human. The
concept of immateriality that I put to work recognises these displacements and the productive
potential of focusing on threshold phenomena as a way of retaining my interest in what is often
carried by the term “psychic,” or sometimes the problem of subjectivity or personality.
However, within the approach I develop in the book the psychic is never ideational or bounded
by a singular human subject. The psychic is part of what I term immateriality (as it took form
within this archive) and I argue that the problem of mind-matter relationships that this raises is
far from solved, or sometimes is barely even recognised.
Stein’s and Solomons’s interest in threshold phenomena was primarily technical (also see
Andrew Barry in relation to Gabriel Tarde’s interest in hypnotic suggestion); whether and how
experiences of automaticity might be staged and enacted within a laboratory setting.
Münsterberg’s interest in technicity and the performativity of non-human agents and actors has
been cogently documented by Henning Schmidgen, who has produced a virtual archive of the
various devices, artefacts, technologies and objects that Münsterberg invented, working closely
with an engineer to populate the laboratory with interested and interesting non-human actors.
[1] However, the particular experiments that Solomons and Stein develop borrow a device
popular within psychic experimentation of the time, associated with the phenomena and
practice of automatic writing. This device was known as a planchette, a small wooden board
on a rolling ball or coasters, fitted with a vertical aperture that could hold a pencil. Within
psychic research this device was used to communicate with spirits, who were seen to
communicate (write) through the mediator (the person holding the pencil) enacting a form of
conjoined mediumship. Perhaps Stein’s interest in this apparatus was carried by her developing
interest in writing and the experience of absorption that often accompanies reading and
writing, but whatever the motivation Stein decided she would be the ideal experimental subject
to undertake the experiment. This would involve periods of training, discipline and
choreography. Through attending to and transforming specific thresholds of sound, labour and
attention, Stein was able to experience her arm moving and writing as an extra-personal entity
– as not-me. These forms of motor automatisms were equated by Stein to a process of becoming
unconscious and reveal the more transitive and processual approach to what was designated
psychological at the time. Stein’s subjectivity was central to the experimental apparatus and her
capacity to affect and be affected by the apparatus was crucial to its efficacy and the effects
that were produced.
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An Analytics of Experimentation
The analytics discussed here represents an important difference to the kinds of analytics of
experimentation which were to later take form within psychology. The American
anthropologist, Emily Martin, has returned to an archive of nineteenth century psychological
experimentation where psychologists, for example, also foregrounded their own subjectivity as
an important part of the experimental apparatus. Martin takes the Cambridge Anthropological
expedition to the Torres Strait Islands in 1898 as her focus, and explores how the method of
introspection (associated with the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, for example) was reworked
within an anthropological approach. Introspection was a key technique for Wundt who was
interested in the measurement of time and argued that psychologists would need to train
themselves so that they could standardise and eliminate variation; to become what Martin
terms the machine capable of introspection. Although introspection was to be supplanted with
other techniques for measuring reaction-time, which I will go on to explore later, introspection
as a particular modality of attending was developed within this expedition as part of an early
ethnographic method.
Martin explores how the scientists W. H. R. Rivers, C. S. Myers and Charles Seligman were all
interested in how the milieu shaped what we might designate as mind and believed that in
order to understand what Martin terms “psychology in its context” they would need to become
anthropologically trained and sensitized embodied instruments. In order to understand “mind”
within the Torres Strait Islanders, the researchers would need to attend to all aspects of the
environment, and this included the mapping of the minute detail of the Islanders’ lives. This
amounted to six detailed volumes of records, which included ethnographic films, sound
recordings, details of all sensory modalities, drawings and other information which articulated
a form of mediated perception; the conjoining of different actors, agencies, objects, and devices,
which might allow the researchers to “see” from an Islander’s perception. As Martin argues,
the researchers acknowledged the lack of accuracy and it might be argued were more
interested in staging their own experiences of transformation that characterised the expedition
than challenging notions of the “generalized mind.”
Martin suggests that this sensitivity to mind or psychology in context is what has increasingly
become lost within contemporary experimental psychology, which has banished subjectivity
and supplanted mind with matter, where as she argues, the “psychological subject becomes a
particular kind of stripped down entity, a data-emitting being whose subjective experience is
outside the frame of the experiment” (155). It is this stripped down entity, which Martin argues
affect theory has inherited (also see Ruth Leys and similar arguments made in Immaterial
Bodies). Martin introduces this stripped down entity by taking her own experiences of
participating within a particular psychological experiment, which was designed to measure her
responses to a series of photographs. As she argues,
because it was so difficult to gain ethnographic access to any of the many
psychology labs I approached – run by colleagues, neighbors, and even friends – I
resorted to participating as a volunteer subject in various currently ongoing
experiments accessible through the websites of all major psychology departments. I
was struck by how irrelevant my experience as a subject was to the experimenters.
In one experiment, for example, I was hooked up to electrodes used to measure
small facial movements of which I was unaware that would indicate my emotional
responses to photographs presented on the computer screen in front of me. I
pressed keys on the keyboard to register my conscious responses to these images. A
software program tallied the results. My responses were produced, I was told, by
specific parts of my brain. What the researchers sought were data about how my
brain reacted to the photographs. But there were confounding elements all over the
place in this experimental setting. For example, although the monitor I was to
attend to and make my responses to was right in front of me, just on my left was
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another monitor that showed the varying electrical impulses from my electrodes. I
noted to the experimenter that I could easily see the readout of my own responses,
and she said, “That’s fine; it doesn’t matter.” But it mattered to me. I could not help
trying to catch a glance of the varying signal, and I wondered how this distraction
might affect my responses.(149)
The banishment of subjectivity from experimental psychology has become a fairly routinized
and normalized part of the apparatus, where even when the interest of the experimental
subject is acknowledged, perhaps by measuring boredom levels (see Bem), the subject is
primarily viewed as either an unwitting participant to be deceived by the experimenter, or as
contributing confounding variables, which ideally should be managed and eliminated from the
scene. Subjectivity is often and usually replaced and translated into particular kinds of data by
a range of inscription devices, measuring tools, imaging technologies, and psychometric tests,
for example, which translate and reduce subjectivity to particular physiological and
neurological marks or traces. I want to extend Martin’s critique by exploring this banishment of
subjectivity in relation to the history of experiments of reaction-time as they took form within
physiology, one of psychology’s close partners.
This history, following Schmidgen, might be considered a history of “machines,” of what he
calls “those spatially circumscribed and temporarily limited installations that connect a vast
number of heterogeneous components: partial objects derived from the experimenter and the
experimental subject (eyes, hands, voices, etc), more or less isolated organs (hearts, lungs,
muscles, nerves, etc), energy sources, styli, sooted paper, tables, notes and publications” (211).
In this context Schmidgen analyses the Donders Machine, a specific material-semiotic
apparatus which physiologists used in the nineteenth century to measure the speed of
excitation within nerves, producing all kinds of “epistemic” and even aesthetic effects.
Schmidgen develops the concept of the experiment as a machinic apparatus via the work of
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari and particularly the assumption that subjectivity is
transversal; that is that technologies and bodies are “always component parts of each other”
(216 – a view that he also credits to the work of Donna Haraway).
What is striking about these early forms of physiological experimentation on reaction-time is the
rather materialist body that is recruited and articulated by the experimental apparatus.
Schmidgen recognises that the human body, as it was articulated by the apparatus, offered
“itself for an almost infinite number of experimental variations” (221), but that the body was
very much conceived as a rather flat organic body, connected and restricted by
neurophysiological measures (galvanic skin response, heart-rate, temperature and so forth).
This created a separation and distinction between the physiological and the psychological
(viewed as an autonomous realm), engendered he suggests by the machinic practices of the
experimental apparatus “based on its own practice of intensities” (231). Thus the body was
produced and enacted as an anatomical and physiological entity, helping to engender a split
between the physiological and psychological, which endures to this day. It is this split which I
argue is largely unexamined within new materialism with its increasing turn towards the
neurosciences, and which can usefully be foregrounded by a critical examination of what might
be carried by the concept of immaterialities. I suggest that this taken for granted split between
the physiological and the psychological is part of a history of how mind-matter relationships
were enacted within and across psychology, and was one of the conditions which led to
subjectivity being banished from the scene (see an article forthcoming in Subjectivity for an
extension of this argument).
This split has prevented psychology from opening up the problem of immateriality in ways that
re-activate the more performative approaches to threshold phenomena that were there at the
beginning of psychology (also see LaChapelle). It also closes down radical engagement with
threshold phenomena and immaterial processes, where for the most part such experiences are
consigned to pathology or viewed as irrational perceptions. At best they represent puzzling
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challenges and anomalies that exceed and exhaust psychology’s capacity to know. Importantly
these histories of the banishment of subjectivity from the psychological, cognitive and later the
neurosciences are an important reminder for what might be at stake when arts and humanities
scholars develop alliances with science and engage science to authenticate and validate their
claims (also see Papoulias and Callard). The concept of immateriality for me opens up these
questions and adds an important rejoinder to the turn to materiality, which obscures and
overlooks the continuing importance of mind-matter relations in our theorising. In the next
section I want to develop these arguments by considering the phenomena of voice hearing
within the context of these arguments. I hope to further open up what I think is at stake in
enacting different conceptions of immateriality for shaping collaborative work across the
science, arts and humanities.
Gaps, Silences, Anomalies, Surprises: Towards a Future-Psychology of Immateriality
Voice hearing itself is a phenomenon that suggests that we can be moved by pasts, both known
and unknown, which are experienced often as non-subjective or extra-personal, and which
operate in registers which might be considered non-cognitive, and which challenge distinctions
between the material and immaterial. The definition of voice-hearing or what psychiatry tends
to term hallucinations is interesting in this respect. Psychiatry defines voice hearing, or what
are usually described as auditory hallucinations as being a “sensory perception without
external stimulation of the relevant sense organ” (DSM III: 498). The perception has what is
considered the reality of a “true perception” and can be acted upon in the way one might act
upon so-called normal perceptions. Voice hearing therefore shares characteristics with other
phenomena that might also be considered immaterial, according to this definition. This might
include experiences of phantom limbs, for example, where a person experiences sensation that
is phenomenologically “real” for them and yet cannot be seen in the conventional
methodological sense (see Sobchack).
In this section I will give some examples of radical practices and forms of experimentation with
voices that are based on the practices of the Hearing Voices Network. In previous work,
specifically Hearing Voices: Embodiment and Experiment I have discussed how the Hearing Voices
Network has a long history of challenging and re-working the psychiatric definition of voice
hearing and introducing issues which confound and disrupt the version of immateriality that
psychiatry has helped to instantiate. The examples I will develop are based on fictional and
non-fictional elements, which are assembled from over twenty years of working with and
collaborating with voice hearers. Imagine, for example, a voice hearer who hears persistent
voices, which might be accusatory, persecutory, abusive, humiliating, not wanted and certainly
not to be listened to. They may already have engaged in certain techniques of distraction (such
as listening to music, for example), in order to lessen the experience of automaticity they might
have in this context. They may or may not take psychotropic drugs, but importantly if they do
the drugs do not lessen the frequency or amplitude of the voices. They feel overwhelmed and
unable to continue in such a relationship and cannot reduce or overcome the voices through
their own voluntarist actions.
Imagine if the voices that the voice hearer hears could be profiled and even given their own
Facebook profile, blog or twitter account so that third parties can interact with the voices. This
might sound outlandish or farfetched, but points to the importance of approaching,
understanding and intervening in voice hearing experiences as trans-subjective phenomena
that can and perhaps need to be shared, experienced and transformed within co-constitutive
relations with others; human and non-human. Indeed, the example of voice-profiling and even
the use of social media to transform voices is one that comes from the pioneering work of the
radical British clinical psychologist and voice hearer, Rufus May. This is just one example of
work that is transforming voice hearing to emerge from the Hearing Voices Network, which is
documenting and staging a range of voice hearing experiences which challenge our
conceptions of voices and how we might approach, analyse and experiment with
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automaticities.
In a recent symposium on voice hearing supported by the Wellcome institute in the UK, May
recounts his experience of working with voice-dialoguing and using social media to extend this
experience. Voice-dialoguing is a technique that has been developed to allow a third person or
party to listen and interact with voices that somebody else hears, and although many want to
claim this as related to cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) there are important and complex
ways in which such an approach resists such appropriation. This is perhaps best illustrated by
the use of social media in this context and how this transforms the experience of what it means
to listen with, to, and through another’s voice/voices. The complex relations between social
media, affect and mediation are a pertinent topic within media and cultural theory, and it is
not my intent to discuss these debates here. What is of interest is the way in which telepathic
conceptions of power have been used by some to describe the logic of social media; the concept
of teleasthesia for example – perception across space and time – has been used in a recent book
to describe capital flow and information within advanced capitalism (Wark).
This moves beyond an idea of doubling often invoked to describe the experiential dimensions of
social media (the idea that we can now be in multiple places at once), or to time being
intensified or speeded up such as in the work of Paul Virilio, to a focus on the different
temporalities articulated by social media, which might include a blurring of distinctions
between past and present, for example. The focus on the historicity of time and temporality is
of interest in relation to voice hearing, as voice hearing is itself an experience which suggests
that pasts can be communicated in the present, and particularly pasts which have or indeed
cannot be articulated by conversantly self-present subjects. These pasts might be
“unrepresentable,” unsaid or foreclosed (Davoine and Guadilliere) and require what Grace
Cho, following John Johnstone calls machinic or distributed perception; a “new form of
collective psychic apparatus” (174). This commitment to an “assemblaged body” takes
psychological processes out of a distinctly human and closed psychological apparatus.
This trans-subjective and distributive way of approaching immaterial processes assumes that
pasts can be carried in the present and that attending to the non-conscious requires creative
techniques of experimentation. This might be related to what Bracha Ettinger, in the context of
art-work or art-working (thus avoiding a static, representational logic), calls the matrixial. The
matrixial relates to the concept of “subjectivity-as-encounter” (64), where several partners work
“conjointly but differently” sharing traces, fragments, fantasies, pictograms, traumas, etc, in
order to produce what she terms “non-conscious readjustments” and “reattunements of
transsubjectivity” (65). Although Ettinger is primarily using art-working as a method of
encounter, social media also provides an interesting creative method for working with the
matrixial. I think this provides an important way of understanding Rufus May’s interventions
with voices using social media, which allow him and others to listen to and speak with voices.
In many cases this process changes the experience of the voice/s for the voice hearer who
becomes an intermediary but not necessarily a mediator; i.e., not necessarily being the agent of
change and transformation.
May describes the process of experimenting with voices through talking to a voice hearer's
voices; where the voices are verbalized by the voice hearer and shared with the listener. He
decides to construct a Facebook profile for one particular voice, known as Topdog, [2]
assembling the fragments of the voice’s distinctly emerging personalities. This allows him to
interact with the voice, to sometimes enlist different voices as consultants and ask for their help,
and to build up a typology of some of the different strategies the voice uses to get the voice
hearer and others to listen. This allows both voice hearer and listener to begin to build up a
shared and co-created characterisation of the voices, which are taken out of the singular, closed
psychological subject, and shared in a process of co-enaction and co-constitution. The Facebook
profile also allows for multiple listeners to work “conjointly but differently” (Ettinger 64),
allowing for fragments to be shared, put together, heard and adjusted during the processes of
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listening and hearing, within an environment which creates a collective sense of (virtual)
presence. This communalism is further extended in the present as Top Dog now also has a blog
and can be followed on Twitter. As May attests, these practices, although controversial, do
work for many voice hearers. They help to change the phenomenological experience of the
voices for both hearer and listener(s), leading to less abusive voices, or to an experience that the
voices are shared interlocuters within the person’s trans-subjectivity and offer important
advice, wisdom, knowledge and information and ideally can be lived-with. This might allow a
change in what Vivian Sobchack has termed the person’s “morphological imagination”; that is
a radical change in their sense of embodiment, which extends the person’s sense of embodied
self and cannot be grafted onto an atomized and individualized subjectivity.
May aligns his role as a trusted listener to that of a technical medium, channelling the voices
and allowing them to take form through a particular apparatus of experimentation. Much like
the experiments carried out by Stein and Solomons that I opened the article with, these
experimental laboratories displace distinctions between the intentional and non-intentional, the
material and immaterial and self and other, and rather work with and through specific
threshold conditions; that is, meeting points of intensities, practices, forms of training, discipline
and choreography, which allow for a change or transformation in how an entity takes form
and is experienced. These practices, which I explore under the designation of immateriality,
allow imaginative work on psyche, the non-conscious and automaticity to be enacted and
transformed. The focus on immateriality, or immaterial processes and their ambiguous status
within the sciences, might also open up our own research to more creative experimentation
with method, attuning to what it might be possible to produce, perform and enact in our own
research, developing a more performative and post-psychological approach to what haunts
contemporary psychology.
Martin explores this proposition in relation to the kinds of psychology that are being imported
into affect theories (and particularly the neurosciences), which underpin some of the well-
rehearsed mantras that have taken form. This includes the statement that affect does not
require a subject to register and that there is a half second delay between thought and action
(Thrift). These are complex debates, which oscillate between providing a materialist grounding
within the neurosciences linked to what Nicholas Rose and Joelle Abi-Rached term Libetism, [3]
through to what Brian Massumi has termed the “autonomy of affect.” The autonomy of affect
does not reduce to brain lag or gap, but rather invests this apparent temporal dissociation with
potentiality, overlaid by a Deleuzian reading of the virtual/actual. However, the performative
force of these statements has partially contributed to the “material” and increasingly the non-
human and object-oriented turns, which are often taken to diminish the need for work on
subjectivity and relegate such concerns to a minor literature. These turns are in danger of
setting up what Ruth Leys has termed a false dichotomy between mind and matter. As I argue
in my book, the relationship between mind and matter formulated in this way is a central
problematic and one often overlooked in the affective and new materialist turns. The
immaterial includes the material and in the approach that I am taking always already implies
mediation to take form. In other words I do not wish to simply replace or supplant mind with
matter as is the manner within many approaches that come under the umbrella of new
materialism. As Barad herself has cautioned, sociology should not be reduced to biology and
people should not be reduced to atoms. The liveliness of matter and the entanglement of matter
and meaning do not preclude discussions of immateriality, which as I show raise interesting
questions for who and what we take ourselves to be. These questions are also central to
quantum mechanics and physics (Radin), and enter into the frame of some contemporary forms
of psychological experimentation that are currently courting controversy (see Bem).
Conclusion
The concept of immateriality framed through the phenomena of threshold experiences raises
important questions concerning how we approach and analyse mind-matter relationships. One
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should not replace mind with matter and assume that the problem is over or dealt with. Within
this context I take seriously Barad’s lesser repeated statement and caution that people are not
particles and that drawing such analogies is not her business (24). However, I also take
seriously the argument that we need a “posthumanist performative understanding of the
materialisation of bodies” (34) and what has come to be framed as the “more-than-other-and-
human-world” (Hughes and Lury). The concept of new materialities when placed within the
genealogy of psychological experimentation that is the subject of this paper does not
adequately, satisfactorily or sensitively carry what might be at stake when examining and
approaching experiences and phenomena that have been historically designated under the sign
of the psychic or the psychological. I hope that the partial approach to this question and
problematic I outline in this paper goes some way to opening up the enduring significance of
this issue.
My argument to conclude this paper is that the more-than-other-and-human ontology carried
by the turn to new materialities has an interesting precursor in the approaches to the psychic
and psychological as threshold phenomena that can be found in this early psychological
archive. These archives of experimentation and the analytics they shaped and developed were
populated by human, non-human and sometimes other-worldly actors and agents, and a post-
human performativity was central to how the experiments were conceived and carried out. The
subjectivity of the experimenter was also an important part of the apparatus later to be
banished by a more positivist experimental practice and the reduction of subjectivity at best to
physiological traces and measures. We inherit this problem in our own potential engagements
with contemporary science, which is increasingly characteristic of the new rapprochements
being made between science, arts and the humanities. The concept of new immaterialities, the
subject of this special issue, opens up these issues and is a welcome rejoinder. The concept of
future-psychology coined in this paper goes some way I hope to mining the potential of a
psychology-yet-to-come by returning to an early psychological archive that has much to offer
us in the present. This archive is largely written out of contemporary historiographies of
psychology, cognitive science and the neurosciences. It returns in the form of displaced and
submerged narratives, concepts, actors and agencies that are being reactivated by a number of
contemporary science controversies. But that is another story!
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Endnotes
1. Schmidgen, Henning. 2008. Münsterberg’s Photoplays: Instruments and Models in his
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Laboratories at Freiburg and Harvard (1891-1893). The Virtual Laboratory (ISSN 1866-
4784), 
<vlp.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/references?id=art71> 
2. Topdog also has his own blog and Twitter account. 
See <www.madinamerica.com/2013/04/the-world-according-to-top-dog/> 
3. Libetism is a term that Rose and Abi-Rached use to refer to the way experiments on
“readiness potential,” carried out by the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet and colleagues in
the 1980s, have become the oft-cited experiment (particularly those experiments that
were written up in the journal Brain in 1983), used to authenticate the assumption that
the brain acts before conscious initiation of an act (of thought). As they argue, despite the
fact that contemporary understandings are more complex, nuanced and contested,
Libetism is “alive and well,” not only within the contemporary neurosciences, but
increasingly across the humanities (and particularly within some stands of affect theory).
I have written about the problems with Libetism in relation to contemporary automaticity
research and the phenomenology of will in a forthcoming article in Subjectivity, which
might be of interest to some readers.
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